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Abstract 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, there has been a widespread call for reform of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as it became clear that its current institutional 
architecture lacks an automatic stabilisation mechanism to prevent economic shocks and to 
mitigate their impact. A European unemployment benefits scheme (EUBS) has long been 
discussed as one potential stabilisation mechanism. In this report, we explore this option in 
more depth. We start from 18 EUBS variants, of two types – equivalent and genuine – for which 
we assess the legal and operational feasibility of introducing these schemes and the added 
value that they would bring. Our analysis focuses on added value in terms of macroeconomic 
stabilisation as well as the potential contribution to labour mobility and Europe’s social 
dimension. The feasibility assessment covers legal and operational options and constraints at 
the national and EU levels. The report further devotes attention to important challenges such 
as institutional moral hazard, permanent transfers and EUBS implementation. 
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ost EU member states are equipped with a set of powerful instruments to mitigate 
the effect of economic shocks on employment and income. With the inception of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), countries have lost control over their 
monetary policy, which instead is now managed centrally at the EMU level. Fiscal policy, which 
comprises important automatic stabilisers such as a country’s unemployment insurance 
scheme, remained a national competence. EMU does not have such a stabilisation mechanism.  
In the past, EMU’s dual institutional architecture has been strongly criticised and many have 
called for reform, especially after the financial crisis starting in 2008 and the subsequent 
European debt crisis. This weakness was also underlined more recently in the Five Presidents’ 
Report “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” published in 2015, which 
proposed introducing in the longer term a fiscal stabilisation function for the monetary union. 
Such automatic stabilisation at the euro area level should provide a cushion for large 
macroeconomic shocks, thereby making EMU more resilient overall, provided that a significant 
degree of economic and financial integration is achieved, together with further pooling of 
decision-making on national budgets and democratic accountability.1 The exact design of such 
stabilisers requires more in-depth work on the legal, economic and political preconditions. 
A European unemployment benefits scheme (EUBS) has long been discussed as one possible 
response to stabilisation needs, among other potential stabilisation mechanisms. In 2014, the 
European Commission, following a request by the European Parliament, commissioned an 
investigation into the feasibility and added value of an EUBS as a fiscal stabilisation mechanism 
for the eurozone (for more details on the project, see Annex 1). This study was conducted by a 
consortium led by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and examined 18 EUBS 
variants (on which more details are provided in Annex 2). It does not represent the 
Commission’s position. A comparative assessment of the EUBS with other stabilisers, however, 
was beyond the scope of this study. 
                                                        
 Miroslav Beblavý is Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Karolien Lenaerts is Researcher at CEPS. The authors are 
grateful to the consortium partners for their feedback and input. The authors would also like to thank the 
European Commission for its feedback on previous versions of this document. And finally the authors would like 
to thank Ilaria Maselli for her important contribution to the project. 
1 https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf. 
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1. Which mechanisms could be envisaged as macroeconomic stabilisers for EMU? 
Since the deep recession of 2009, the EU has developed a number of tools to prevent economic 
shocks and mitigate their impact. New instruments were introduced when it became clear 
during the crisis that the common monetary policy and national fiscal policy were not 
sufficiently adapted to deal with these challenges, especially when shocks are asymmetric in 
nature. Other instruments, such as labour mobility or price and wage adjustments, are also not 
very powerful in Europe.  
Two important tools for crisis prevention are the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) 
and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM, the Banking Union’s first pillar). Other instruments 
have been developed to deal with the impact of severe crises. The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), i.e. the crisis resolution mechanism for member states of the euro area, is 
an important instrument to bolster crisis-struck economies, but it is designed for extreme 
situations and is not triggered automatically; balance-of-payments assistance can be made 
available to non-euro member states. The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme has become a crucial stabilisation instrument but is not intended for prevention.  
EMU as a whole still lacks an automatic stabiliser that would be as responsive to economic 
shocks as national tax-benefit systems. This explains why much attention has been devoted to 
this idea in recent academic and policy debates. Importantly, any stabiliser should comply with 
the four key requirements spelled out in the Five Presidents’ Report: i) it should not lead to 
permanent transfers; ii) it should preserve incentives for sound fiscal policies and for tackling 
structural weaknesses; iii) it should be developed within the existing EU fiscal framework; and, 
finally, iv) it should help prevent crises that would require intervention by the European Stability 
Mechanism. An automatic stabiliser would be a complement to, rather than a substitute for, 
other policy instruments and market mechanisms.  
This project explores the idea of a common European unemployment benefits scheme as a 
supranational automatic stabiliser for EMU. It compares two basic approaches, namely 
equivalent schemes (also called “reinsurance” schemes) and genuine schemes. A genuine EUBS 
would pay unemployment benefits directly to unemployed individuals and would be funded 
through contributions from employers and employees. An equivalent EUBS variant is one in 
which financial transfers from an EUBS would occur only from and towards the member states. 
In this study, equivalent schemes are conditioned by a trigger which determines when funds 
are transferred to a member state: funds are transferred when short-term unemployment in a 
country exceeds its long-term average by a certain percentage, i.e. the threshold. The study 
models 18 EUBS variants of these two basic designs (four equivalent and 14 genuine variants) 
and assesses their legal and operational feasibility and economic added value. Apart from their 
common features (such as being linked to developments in short-term unemployment rates), 
these 18 variants differ from each other in terms of a range of features, e.g. the duration of 
unemployment benefits or the replacement rate.  
Besides a European unemployment insurance scheme, several other potential stabilisers have 
been proposed by academics and policy-makers. Some proposals have considered alternative 
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indicators, such as GDP or the output gap, rather than unemployment. A first example is to 
establish a European fund which is tied to the output gap: member states would pay into the 
fund when their economies perform better than the EMU average and receive a pay-out in the 
opposite case. A more recent idea is to adjust the European Stability Mechanism such that it 
becomes an automatic mechanism. Under current ESM, member states have to apply for a 
bailout and fulfil a number of conditions in order to be eligible, e.g. agree to carry out strict 
economic and fiscal reforms. Another proposal is to create a budget for EMU. This idea was 
introduced in the “Blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary Union” and Four 
Presidents’ Report “Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union” published in 2012. 
Stabilisation instruments could also take the form of public investment programmes, including 
through regional policies, but these typically require long lead-times and would only have a 
delayed impact. A comparative assessment of all the options for a stabilisation mechanism has 
yet to be done. 
2. What would be the added value of a European unemployment benefits scheme? 
Unemployment benefits are very responsive to economic shocks to the extent that 
unemployment rises quickly (albeit with a lag following an output contraction) and benefits 
almost immediately replace lost income from employment. That also makes them more 
countercyclical than other elements of tax-benefit systems or public investment programmes, 
particularly if a temporary increase in benefits can be financed by issuing debt rather than by 
raising additional contributions. An EUBS could therefore contribute to macroeconomic 
stabilisation to deal with shocks that cannot be managed at the national level alone.  
There are two key questions in this regard: To what extent can a European unemployment 
benefits scheme enhance the stabilisation capacity of the existing national unemployment 
benefits schemes (NUBS)? And what additional stabilisation effects can it achieve? One could 
argue that the national unemployment insurance schemes have many characteristics in 
common with their European counterpart, e.g. the swift response to shocks and a high 
multiplier effect. In fact, when designing an EUBS, policy-makers can combine a number of 
features that can take a range of values.2 Like the national schemes, an EUBS would come with 
a fixed duration, amount, eligibility conditions, etc. (see Annex 2 for more details). 
Although NUBS could serve as powerful stabilisers, the crisis has shown that they have not 
necessarily achieved their potential, notably as a result of their limited coverage or generosity. 
Coverage refers to the share of the (short-term) unemployed who qualify for unemployment 
benefits. In some countries, the self-employed are not eligible for unemployment benefits, and 
the number of self-employed in the economy can be high. In the event of a crisis, many of these 
self-employed lose their income without receiving any support from the government. Similarly, 
                                                        
2 For example, the amount of unemployment benefits that someone receives is often determined on the basis of 
a reference wage, e.g. gross or net, taken in the last month or an average over a longer period, to which a 
replacement rate is applied (which can be set at 50%, 60% or any other value). 
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if an unemployed individual is only entitled to a very low amount of benefits, this sum may not 
be sufficient to support his or her family, thereby pushing many into poverty. The EUBS variants 
considered in this study generally have a wider coverage than the national schemes. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the coverage differences between the NUBS and the most 
generous genuine EUBS variant (to illustrate the stabilisation potential of an EUBS; under this 
variant, unemployment benefits are paid for 12 months, starting from the first month of 
becoming unemployed). These gaps are particularly pronounced for the member states in 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. In most member states, the young (under 30) would 
stand to gain the most in terms of additional coverage of an EUBS, because short-term 
unemployment is particularly prevalent among them. 
Figure 1. Comparison of coverage of national unemployment benefits schemes (average over 
1995-2013) and a generous EUBS in which payment begins immediately on becoming 
unemployed (Variant 7) 
 
Enhancing the national unemployment benefits schemes, for example by improving their 
coverage and generosity, would by itself already increase the stabilisation capacity within EMU. 
While it is conceivable to move to enhanced benefit systems through benchmarks, such a 
process would take time and it could be politically and fiscally difficult to impose more generous 
unemployment benefits in the absence of a common funding arrangement. 
Furthermore, EUBS attain stabilisation through two additional channels: spatial and inter-
temporal insurance. Spatial insurance implies that the risk and costs of unemployment are 
pooled across a group of countries, instead of being borne by a single member state. This is 
where a common EUBS could bring an important added value vis-à-vis the national schemes.  
Inter-temporal insurance implies a reallocation of resources over time. One way to achieve this 
is by allowing the EUBS to issue debt. If an EUBS runs out of funds, it could collect additional 
contributions from the member states or issue debt. Raising additional contributions is, 
however, likely to reduce the scheme’s stabilisation capacity and may result in a procyclical 
stance by having to raise more money when the member states are still mired in a deep 
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recession (and possibly cutting their spending). In addition, the EU’s complex institutional 
framework would call for a predetermined, automatic solution. One caveat, however, is that 
there is currently no consensus on common debt financing. Public debt is already very high in 
Europe and the idea of debt-issuing has raised political and moral hazard concerns. 
3. How much stabilisation can an EUBS achieve and at what cost? 
Simulations performed within this study suggest that the scale of the EUBS ranges from 0.03% 
to 0.43% of GDP over the period 1995-2013 (across the 18 variants examined), measured as 
the total value of benefits paid out over 1995-2013 as a share of EA-19 GDP over that period 
(‘gross cost’). Equivalent EUBS variants require less funds than most of the genuine EUBS 
variants (with the exception of the least generous ones); indeed, as the trigger threshold goes 
up in the equivalent schemes, they are activated less frequently, which limits spending. This is 
illustrated in Table 1, which reports the size and stabilisation impacts of three EUBS variants.3  
The total amount of spending through the scheme would have ranged between 0.03% and 
0.13% of GDP if an equivalent EUBS variant had been in place during 1995-2013, and between 
0.11% and 0.43% of GDP if a genuine EUBS variant had been in place instead.4 The spending 
differs according to the scheme’s features. For example, equivalent variants with a higher 
trigger threshold are less expensive than those with lower thresholds, as they are activated less 
often (0.13% of GDP for a trigger threshold set at 0.1%; 0.05% of GDP for a 1% threshold and 
0.03% of GDP for a 2% threshold). For the genuine EUBS variants, the schemes with the biggest 
financing needs are those with a long duration (0.43% of GDP for a genuine EUBS with a 12-
month duration) and high replacement rates (0.32% of GDP for a scheme with a replacement 
rate of 60% of the last gross wage). 
The stabilisation effect of the EUBS is captured by its impact on the level and growth rate of 
GDP. Table 1 shows the impact on the level of GDP in 2009 for EMU. In 2009, EA-19 GDP fell 
sharply. If an EUBS had been in place over 1995-2013, GDP would have been up to 0.2% higher 
in the EA-19 in 2009 (the trough of the recession). These results reflect also the assumption 
that the EUBS would be more generous than current national UBS.5 
 
                                                        
3 Note that the higher payments at the supranational level would to some extent be offset by reduced payments 
at the national level, e.g. reduced payments on national unemployment benefits or social assistance.  
4 These numbers refer to the share of whole period GDP. 
5 An estimate of the stabilisation effect due to enhanced unemployment benefits can be found in Dolls et al. (2016), 
“An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area? A Comparison of Different Alternatives using Micro 
Data”, CESifo Working Paper No. 5581 (revised). 
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Table 1. Summary metrics of three EUBS variants applied to EA-19 and their stabilisation effect 
   
Scale: 
Spending 1995-2013 as % of GDP 
GDP impact in EA19 in 2009:  
Deviation from actual GDP level in %  
Equivalent schemes 
High macro threshold 
to trigger payment 0.05 0.09 
Low macro threshold 
to trigger payment 0.13 0.21 
Genuine scheme 
No waiting period 
before benefit 
payment starts 0.43 0.18 
The table shows that equivalent EUBS have a stronger stabilisation effect for a given level of 
spending. The equivalent EUBS variants examined in this study are tied to a trigger and 
therefore are not active all the time but rather are focused on crisis years. An EUBS with a 
trigger threshold in the range of 1 to 1.5 percentage points appears to strike a good balance 
between a too low threshold and a too high threshold. An EUBS would be triggered if a 
country’s short-term unemployment rate exceeds its long-term average by this percentage. 
Genuine schemes, by contrast, operate continuously and thus imply a higher level of spending 
(0.43% of GDP vs. 0.05% of GDP). For the set of genuine EUBS variants examined in the project, 
those with strict eligibility conditions, short durations and low replacement rates were found 
to have a lower stabilisation capacity than their counterparts. 
Simulations were also carried out to assess whether an EUBS that was not permitted to issue 
debt would have a weaker stabilisation effect. In that case, additional contributions would have 
to be raised from member states in the years of any shortfall of revenues compared to spending 
by the EUBS. The impact depends on the amount of reserves the EUBS would be allowed to 
build up before a significant call is made upon its resources. If a no-debt EUBS had been in place 
over 1995-2013, there would have been a significant stabilisation effect during the 2008-09 
crisis because, by then, according to the assumed EUBS design, sufficient reserves would have 
been built up (in 2008, the no-debt EUBS variant has a surplus of roughly 0.18% of GDP, which 
goes down to zero in subsequent years).6    
Another illustration of the stabilisation capacity of the EUBS can be found in Figure 2 and Figure 
3, which present actual historical real GDP growth rates for four countries (along with the EMU 
average for comparison) and the impacts that the three EUBS variants in Table 1 would have 
had on the growth rate in each year. The four countries experienced relatively large deviations 
                                                        
6 The no-debt EUBS variant is at zero balance until about 2006 (because it cannot go into debt, and the comparison 
with the EUBS that can issue debt shows that in those years the non-debt constraint is binding), builds up a surplus 
of less than 0.25% of GDP by 2008, and runs down that surplus in subsequent years. 
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in annual GDP growth rates relative to the EMU rate, averaged over 1995-2013.7 In each case, 
the middle chart shows the difference to the annual GDP growth rate that the EUBS variants 
would have brought about, while the lower chart shows the percentage difference in the level 
of GDP. These impacts reflect the scale and timing of contributions to, and pay-outs from, the 
EUBS fund. Note that there is a very large difference in scale between the upper chart, on the 
one hand, and the middle and lower charts on the other: the largest impact is for Latvia in 2009, 
when GDP growth would have been 0.76 percentage points higher in the presence of a ‘high-
threshold’ EUBS variant, which would have mitigated its decline in GDP in that year from -14.3% 
to -13.6%.  
The upper charts in Figure 2 illustrate that both Latvia and Slovakia experienced low GDP 
growth in 1999, followed by a marked acceleration in growth up to 2007 (in contrast to the EA-
19 average). Latvia’s recession in 2009 was far more severe than the EA-19 average; Slovakia’s 
was only slightly more severe. The middle charts confirm that the two equivalent EUBS variants 
would have tended to have somewhat larger growth stabilisation effects (both positive and 
negative), but their scale is modest.8 These charts also show how quickly the positive impact on 
growth in Latvia would have been curtailed under the rules of equivalent schemes (in fact, the 
level of GDP would have been lower in 2011 in both equivalent schemes, and particularly in the 
high-threshold version, under the rules assumed for the EUBS). 
The cases of Greece and Ireland are shown in Figure 3. In these countries, GDP growth was not 
only more volatile than the EA-19 average, but also incorporated rather different long-term 
trends. Ireland saw a steady slowdown from the high growth rates in the beginning of the 
period, and went into recession earlier than the EA-19 average. If the two equivalent EUBS had 
been in place, the 2009 decline in GDP would have been reduced by about 0.4 percentage 
points (from -4.6% to -4.2%). For Greece, the scale of the estimated stabilisation impact of the 
EUBS is much smaller, which reflects the ineligibility of self-employed workers for the European 
scheme. Moreover, the temporary nature of EUBS support is also clear from the charts: the 
positive contribution to growth would soon have reversed, even as the recession persisted. 
                                                        
7 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania stand out as having recorded by far the largest difference in annual growth rates 
over 1995-2013 compared with the EA-19 rate. Because their experience was broadly similar, Latvia is shown here 
as broadly representative of all three cases, to allow the figures to present some contrasting cases. 
8 The negligible impact in Slovakia during the recession reflects the fact that the increase in short-term 
unemployment was far smaller in Slovakia than in Latvia, and in Slovakia, the short-term unemployment rate 
remained below the high levels seen over 1999-2004. Consequently, even the ‘low’ threshold to trigger payments 
under an equivalent scheme was not crossed. 
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Figure 2. Historical real GDP growth rates and stabilisation impact of selected EUBS schemes 
on Latvia and Slovakia, if the schemes had operated over 1995-2013 
 
Note: The three variants shown in the figure correspond to the variants reported in Table 1. 
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Figure 3. Historical real GDP growth rates and stabilisation impact of selected EUBS schemes 
on Greece and Ireland, if the schemes had operated over 1995-2013 
 
Note: The three variants shown in the figure correspond to the variants reported in Table 1. 
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While the contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation would have been limited (depending on 
the characteristics of the scheme), an EUBS can have other advantages. To deal with the issue 
of moral hazard (weaker incentives to improve labour market policies and a possible incentive 
for national governments to support people by the EUBS rather than through national social 
protection/assistance systems – see below), an EUBS would require convergence of labour 
market policies and institutional capacity. This precondition could be an opportunity for 
improving labour market policies and enhancing the protection of the unemployed in those 
member states where it is insufficient and where people face a high risk of falling into poverty 
when they lose their job.  
An EUBS could therefore also strengthen the social dimension of EMU and support social 
cohesion, in line with the idea of a European Pillar of Social Rights, even though it should be 
acknowledged that this could also be pursued through soft or hard law initiatives or policy 
coordination processes not related to an EUBS. Simulations conducted for this project reveal 
that under the most generous genuine EUBS variant studied, the proportion of people at risk 
of poverty9 in the monetary union could be reduced by 0.35 percentage points on average in 
the presence of an EUBS (in the hypothetical forward-looking simulations in the year with the 
deepest recession; the rate for the EU is currently around 17%). Finally, an EUBS could be 
designed to facilitate job searches across Europe by making EUBS benefits portable, thus 
contributing to a more integrated European labour market.  
4. How to finance a European unemployment benefits scheme? 
A European unemployment benefits scheme would be financed by contributions from 
countries, or workers and employers, into the supranational fund. To the extent that an EUBS 
enhances the protection of the unemployed in some member states, it will increase public 
expenditure by as much as 0.3% of GDP in countries with the least developed NUBS (Malta, 
Estonia). An EUBS aligned with the countries that have the least developed unemployment 
benefits would severely limit its effectiveness as a stabiliser, and without a common minimum 
level of benefits to be covered by the EUBS, countries would achieve very different levels of 
stabilisation after having experienced a shock of the same magnitude.  
While mitigating the risk of moral hazard, a common level of minimum benefits limits member 
states’ flexibility to adjust their national schemes to national preferences. This is an issue 
especially when a genuine EUBS variant is introduced, as it would (at least partly) replace the 
existing national scheme. Equivalent EUBS variants could be introduced without any restrictions 
on how the government can spend the funds received. A scenario in which governments have 
to use the money in the same way as in the genuine EUBS variants could also be envisaged.  
The effect of an EUBS on total public expenditure at all levels is more difficult to assess. Whereas 
the scheme’s administrative costs are likely to be modest, and the building up of reserves within 
                                                        
9 People are considered at risk of poverty if their disposable household income (adjusted for household size and 
composition) is below 60% of the median income in their member state. 
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the scheme is limited, minimum standards for national unemployment benefits schemes could 
increase spending, especially in member states with less generous systems. Nevertheless, 
minimum requirements are important, particularly for equivalent EUBS variants, to prevent 
member states from cutting back their national schemes to save funds in difficult economic 
times. 
5. Can permanent transfers be avoided? 
The study confirms that a European unemployment benefits scheme could be set up in such a 
way that permanent transfers are avoided. To this end, the scheme would have to be equipped 
with an experience-rating mechanism. Experience rating is a mechanism that connects the pay-
in into the EUBS to the use of the EUBS by demanding higher contributions from countries that 
are likely to use the scheme more (based on their past experience with unemployment in a 
genuine EUBS or the actual number of times the EUBS was used in an equivalent EUBS). In 
addition, a claw-back mechanism could also be considered to collect additional contributions 
from a member state that has built up a persistent deficit vis-à-vis the EUBS. Then, either the 
pay-in of the member state would be raised (equivalent EUBS) or the member state would be 
subject to supplementary contributions (genuine EUBS). While experience rating is an 
automatic mechanism, the study argues that claw-back should be discretionary. The reason is 
that if a claw-back is activated, the member state could still be in a prolonged downturn or just 
recovering from it.  
6. How can institutional moral hazard be mitigated? 
Experience rating and claw-back are also essential to avoiding institutional moral hazard (by 
creating a link between the pay-in into the EUBS and the use of the EUBS). Institutional moral 
hazard refers to a situation in which two levels of government deal with a social risk, one level 
covering this risk, while the other level can influence the risk. In the context of unemployment 
insurance, one can imagine a situation in which a country’s federal government is responsible 
for the financing and payment of unemployment benefits, whereas the activation of the 
unemployed and related policies are left to the lower levels of government. The behaviour of 
the lower levels of government has an impact on the federal level. For example, if (regional or 
local) activation policies are poorly designed or implemented, they may be less effective in 
eradicating unemployment, and thus push up the costs of unemployment benefits at the 
federal level, or in the case of an EUBS, from the national to the European level.  
This study considered the issue of institutional moral hazard in countries with a multi-tiered 
unemployment insurance scheme: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Switzerland and the United States. Institutional moral hazard is embedded in any multi-tiered 
insurance system, and different solutions towards its mitigation have been proposed in the 
countries examined, e.g. minimum standards, financial incentives. At the same time, the 
adverse effects of institutional moral hazard and the costs of mitigating it, have to be weighed 
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against the benefits of insurance, including economic stabilisation, redistribution, social 
cohesion and growth.  
7. What legal and operational concerns would need to be addressed if an EUBS were 
to be adopted? 
7.1 At the national level 
Genuine EUBS variants pose greater challenges than equivalent variants as they partially 
replace the existing national unemployment benefits schemes and leave little flexibility to the 
member states. When introduced, a genuine EUBS would necessitate amendments to the 
national legislation governing unemployment insurance, labour market regulation and related 
domains in all member states. Moreover, in some member states, e.g. France, collective 
agreements would have to be adapted as well. Furthermore, while adapting national 
organisational and financing frameworks to the genuine EUBS would be less problematic in 
member states where the existing NUBS is based on the social insurance principle, in member 
states where the NUBS is very different from the EUBS, e.g. in terms of financing or 
administration, there would be substantial impediments ahead if a genuine EUBS were to be 
introduced, e.g. in Scandinavia. 
Equivalent EUBS variants would not require as many changes, unless their pay-outs would be 
earmarked for spending on employment measures and unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, 
for a few member states, conflicts with national constitutional law are possible or likely for both 
variants, e.g. Germany. If constitutional amendments were required, these typically can only 
be made through a demanding, lengthy and complex process, which could impede the 
introduction of an equivalent EUBS. 
A genuine EUBS is also operationally more challenging than an equivalent variant, due to the 
frequent interactions involved between the European and the national schemes. If an EUBS 
were to be introduced, the most fundamental changes would be required in countries with a 
so-called ‘Ghent system’ (Denmark, Finland and Sweden, where unemployment insurance is 
voluntary and run by social partners) or a liberal welfare system (Ireland, Malta, Poland and the 
UK, where benefits typically are flat-rated). The EUBS could make use of the existing national 
structures, and its implementation would largely be decentralised. However, the institutional 
capacity of the existing bodies may have to be increased in some member states.  
Moreover, when the EUBS benefit expires, the NUBS or national social assistance might 
(re)start. Frequent switching between multiple schemes would cause major administrative and 
operational challenges (with errors and delays as a result) and would be associated with huge 
fluctuations in the amount that someone receives.  
In many member states, social partners play a major role in the design and management of the 
national unemployment benefits schemes. In the context of an EUBS, the role of the social 
partners is therefore also an important factor to take into account. Social partners weigh 
heavily on the design of the NUBS in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland, France, 
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Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia. In Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia, they have a more limited role. Social 
partners are strongly involved in the management of the NUBS in four member states (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and moderately involved in eight of them (Austria, Estonia, 
France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal and Romania).  
7.2 At the European level 
In addition to the legal and operational challenges at the national level, the project examined 
the legal barriers to an EUBS from the European perspective. A European unemployment 
benefits scheme could be established outside of the boundaries of the existing EU legal 
framework, through an intergovernmental agreement which could, for example, apply to only 
a subset of member states. In the view of the authors of this study, however, there might also 
be options for establishing an EUBS (both of a genuine or equivalent nature) within the 
boundaries of the existing Treaties, albeit not for all of the 18 EUBS variants examined. For some 
variants, a Treaty change would be required.  
To establish an EUBS within the existing EU framework, three legal acts would be needed: a 
legal act establishing the financing side of the scheme, a legal act establishing the payments 
side of the scheme and a legal act setting minimum requirements for activation and the 
regulation of the national schemes.10 Separate legal acts are needed where the payment side 
and the financing side must have different legal bases. Moreover, since minimum requirements 
can only be established on the basis of Article 153 TFEU, which is different from the possible 
legal bases for the payment and/or the financing side, they have to be introduced in a separate 
legal act. 
The study examined several options for each of these legal acts and arrived at the following 
conclusions. The financing side of the EUBS could be established within or outside of the EU 
budget on the basis of Article 352(1) TFEU. If set up within the EU budget, the Article allows the 
raising of contributions from member states as well as from individuals; the revenue would 
have to be earmarked for exclusive use by the EUBS. If, instead, the financing side is set up 
outside of the EU budget, there are two options: either an EUBS agency is set up on the basis 
of Article 352(1) TFEU or a separate fund could be established on the basis of an 
intergovernmental agreement. The payments side of the EUBS could be based on Article 352(1) 
TFEU for the equivalent EUBS variants (only two of the four examined) and a combination of 
Articles 175(3) and 352(1) TFEU for the genuine EUBS variants (nine of the 14 variants). In both 
cases, the EUBS would fall within the scope of the ‘no bail-out’ clause (embedded in Article 
125(1) TFEU). Under this clause, the EU may grant assistance to member states if this promotes 
structural reforms and sound budgetary policies. Compliance with Article 125(1) TFEU can be 
achieved by a combination of experience rating, claw-back, and minimum requirements for 
                                                        
10 The regulation of the national schemes (which could be adopted on the basis of Article 153(2)(b) TFEU) ensures 
a smooth transition from the EUBS to the NUBS in case of the genuine EUBS variants and the specification of the 
lump sum transferred from the EUSB to the NUBS in the equivalent case. 
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activation measures. In the absence of these mechanisms, EUBS variants would violate the no 
bail-out clause and therefore cannot be established within the legal framework. 
7.3 Administrative burden 
The main operational barriers to a genuine EUBS would emerge at the member state level. The 
EUBS would be highly demanding for the bodies responsible for unemployment insurance, 
because the parallel operation of the EUBS and NUBS would pose major challenges. The more 
divergent the current NUBS and the EUBS are, the more numerous the operational obstacles if 
an EUBS would be envisaged. These obstacles would be related to the aim and personal scope 
of the scheme, differences in entitlement conditions, e.g. the nature of unemployment, 
assimilated periods and household composition, differences in the calculation bases and 
methods, and other factors. At the national level, the administrative burden would be huge. 
This would call for good information, communication and data collection and exchange 
channels, more and well-trained staff, updated computer systems, arrangements for collecting 
in the contributions and disbursing the pay-outs, etc.  
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Annex 1. About the project 
In July 2014, the European Commission issued a call for tender entitled “Feasibility and Added 
Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme” for a pilot project requested by the 
European Parliament. The tender was awarded to a consortium of research institutions which 
is led by CEPS and further composed of Eftheia, Cambridge Econometrics, the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research (ISER), the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 
(ZEW), Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL). The project 
was launched in February 2015.  
The objective of the project was to assess, in a comprehensive and consistent manner, the 
feasibility and value added of introducing a European unemployment benefits scheme. To this 
end, the project comprises five main tasks that cover the economic, legal and operational 
dimensions of an EUBS.  
A first task was to carry out a literature review of existing realities in federations both within 
and outside of the EU, a review of the existing proposals for an EUBS, and an in-depth analysis 
of the features determining the design of a potential EUBS. More precisely, 18 scheme variants 
were examined.  
The second task was to investigate the legal and operational feasibility of different EUBS forms, 
both at the national and the European level. Feasibility was assessed in terms of compatibility 
with national legislation and practices and with the EU legal framework.  
The third task was to assess the value added of each of the 18 EUBS, in terms of stabilisation 
and social outcomes, through microeconomic and macroeconomic simulations. These analyses 
cover the individual member states, the EU level and the EMU level.  
The two other tasks consisted of consultations with representatives of the member states and 
independent experts, and the organisation of a high-level conference where the main findings 
of the project were presented and debated. 
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Annex 2. The EUBS variants considered 
The 18 EUBS variants examined in this study can be divided into four equivalent and 14 genuine 
schemes, which are characterised by a partially overlapping set of features. Variations in these 
features determine the 18 different EUBS variants (V). This implies that each of the 18 forms is 
closely linked to the others, as each of them is a combination of different versions of these 
features.  
Among the 18 EUBS considered in this study, four are reinsurance and 14 genuine schemes. 
The former are presented in Table A1, the latter are described in Table A2. In its most basic 
form, an equivalent EUBS is characterised by experience rating, claw-back and debt-issuing. The 
equivalent EUBS differ in terms of the design of the trigger, experience rating, claw-back and 
debt-issuing (Table 2). The most important difference lies in the trigger, which is defined in a 
similar way across the variants (V) but has different threshold levels (cut-offs): 0.1% (in V2 and 
V3), 1% (in V1) and 2% (in V4). The EUBS is triggered when the short-term unemployment rate 
in the quarter exceeds the average short-term unemployment rate over the last 40 quarters 
plus a certain percentage. This percentage is equal to 0.1%, 1% or 2%. A cut-off of 0.1% is very 
low, which means that EUBS transfers are frequently triggered. This is the ‘rainy day’ scenario. 
It covers nearly all shocks. The ‘stormy day’ scenario, with its cut-off of 1%, covers fewer shocks 
but is still activated relatively frequently. The highest cut-off of 2% would mean that only very 
severe recessions are covered. Other notable differences between the analysed equivalent 
EUBS are that V1 does not have experience rating, V4 does not have claw-back, and V3 and V4 
do not allow for debt-issuing in case of short-term imbalances.  
Table A2 presents the genuine EUBS and their main features, as they are defined in this project. 
The standard genuine scheme is V5 (represented in the first row of the table). V5 is a basic 
genuine EUBS that pays out unemployment benefits to all the unemployed who have worked 
as employees during at least three out of the last 12 months. These individuals are entitled to 
unemployment benefits equal to 50% of their last gross wage, capped at 150% of the national 
average wage. Benefits are paid out for a period of nine months, from the start of the fourth 
month until the end of the 12th month of unemployment (M3-M12). V5 is further characterised 
by experience rating, claw-back and debt-issuing, but it does not allow for cyclical variability 
(which means that certain features of the scheme can be adjusted in severe circumstances). 
The 13 other variants are all based on V5. In fact, they are identical to V5 with the exception of 
one feature, for which they take a different value. The nine features to take into account are: 
basic or top-up (V6 top-up, where the unemployed are guaranteed a minimum benefit and the 
EUBS only intervenes when the national benefit does not meet this minimum), benefit duration 
(V7 M0-M12, V8 M3-M6), replacement rate (V9 is set at 35%, V10 60%), eligibility criteria (V11 
3M out of 6M, V12 12M out of 24M), capping (V13 100%, V14 50%), cyclical variability (V15 
yes), experience rating (V16 no), claw-back (V17 no) and debt-issuing (V18 no). 
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Table A1. An overview of the reinsurance systems examined in the project 
 Trigger Experience rating Claw-back Debt 
V1  𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40 … 𝑡−1 > 1% 
No Yes Yes 
V2   𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40… 𝑡−1 > 0.1% 
Yes Yes Yes 
V3    𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40 … 𝑡−1 > 0.1% 
Yes Yes No 
V4 𝑈𝑅𝑡,𝑖 − 𝑈𝑅𝑖,𝑡−40,…,𝑡−1 > 2% 
Yes No No 
Table A2. An overview of the genuine systems examined in the project 
  Basic or 
top-up 
Duration 
Replacement 
rate 
Eligibility Capping 
Cyclical 
variability 
Experience 
rating 
Claw-
back 
Debt 
  
V5 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V6 Top-up M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V7 Basic M0-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V8 Basic M3-M6 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V9 Basic M3-M12 35% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V10 Basic M3-M12 60% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V11 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 6M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V12 Basic M3-M12 50% 12M out of 24M 150% No Yes Yes Yes 
V13 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 100% No Yes Yes Yes 
V14 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 50% No Yes Yes Yes 
V15 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% Yes Yes Yes Yes 
V16 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No No Yes Yes 
V17 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes No Yes 
V18 Basic M3-M12 50% 3M out of 12M 150% No Yes Yes No 
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